TRANSLATE RUS
PREFACE
Every day brings a ship.
Every ship brings a word;
Well for those who have no fear,
Looking seaward well assured
That the word the vessel brings
Is the word they wish to hear.
EMERSON wrote the poem I have stolen for a headpiece to this letter, and
Emerson wrote the best commentary on that poem: " If there is any period
one would desire to be born in-is it not the age of Revolution; when the
old and the new stand side by side, and admit of being compared; when
the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope; when the
historic glories of the old can be compensated by the rich possibilities
of the new era? This time, like all times, is a very good one, if we but
know what to do with it." Revolution divides men by character far more
sharply than they are divided by war. Those whom the Gods love take the
youth of their hearts and throw themselves gladly on that side, even if,
clear sighted, they perceive that the fires of revolution will burn up
perhaps the very things that, for themselves, they hold most dear. Those
others, wise, circumspect, foolish with the folly of wisdom, refrain,
and are burned up none the less. It is the same with nations, and I send
this pamphlet to America because America supported the French Revolution
when England condemned it, and because now also America seems to me to
look towards Russia with better will to understand, with lest suspicion,
without the easy cynicism that prepares the disaster at which it is
afterwards ready to smile. Not that I think all this is due to some
special virtue in America. I have no doubt it is due to geographical and
economic conditions. America is further from this bloody cockpit of
Europe, for one thing. For another, even rich Americans dependent for
their full pockets on the continuance of the present capitalist system,
can wholeheartedly admire the story of the Bolshevik adventure, and even
wish for its success, without fearing any serious damage to the edifice
in which they live. Or it may be, that, knowing so little about America,
I let myself think too well of it. Perhaps there too men go about
repeating easy lies, poisoning the wells of truth from simple lack of
attention to the hygiene of the mind. I do not know. I only know that,
from the point of view of the Russian Revolution, England seems to be a
vast nightmare of blind folly, separated from the continent, indeed from
the world, by the sea, and beyond that by the trenches, and deprived, by
some fairy godmother who was not invited to her christening, of the
imagination to realize what is happening beyond. Shouting in daily
telegrams across the wires from Russia I feel I am shouting at a drunken
man asleep in the road in front of a steam roller. And then the
newspapers of six weeks ago arrive, and I seem to see that drunk,
sleeping fool make a motion as if to brush a fly from his nose, and take
no further notice of the monstrous thing bearing steadily towards him. I
love the real England, but I hate, more than I hate anything on earth (except
cowardice in looking at the truth) the intellectual sloth, the gross
mental indolence that prevents the English from making an effort of
imagination and realizing how shameful will be their position in history
when the story of this last year in the biography of democracy comes to
be written. How shameful, and how foolish ... for they will one day be
forced to realize how appalling are the mistakes they committed, even
from the mere bestial standpoint of self interest and expediency.
Shameful, foolish and tragic beyond tears ... for the toll will be paid
in English blood. English lads will die and English lads have died, not
one or two, but hundreds of thousands, because their elders listen to
men who think little things, and tell them little things, which are so
terribly easy to repeat. At least half our worst mistakes have been due
to the underestimation of some person or force outside England, and
disturbing to little men who will not realize that chaos has come again
and that giants are waking in the world. They look across Europe and see
huge things, monstrous figures, and, to save themselves, and from
respect for other little lazy minds, they leap for the easiest tawdry
explanation, and say, " Ah yes, bogies made in Germany with candles
inside turnip heads!" And having found their miserable little
atheistical explanation they din it into everybody, so that other people
shall make the same mistakes, and they have company in folly, and so be
excused. And in the end it becomes difficult for even honestminded,
sturdy- folk in England to look those bogies squarely in their turnip
faces and to see that they are not bogies at all, but the real article,
giants, whose movements in the mist are of greater import for the future
of the world than anything else that is happening in our day.
I think it possible that the revolution will fail. If so, then its
failure will not mean that it loses its importance. The French
Revolution gave a measure of freedom to every nation in Europe, although
it failed most notably in France and ended in a dictator and a defeated
dictator at that, and for the brave clear-sighted France foreseen by
Diderot and Rousseau substituted a France in which thought died and
every one was free to grub money with a view to enslaving everybody else.
The failure of the French Revolution did not lessen the armor which the
ideas that sprang from it poured into the minds that came to their
maturity between 1795 and 1801. And perhaps it was that failure which
sharpened the conflict of the first half of the nineteenth century, in
which, after all, many candles were lit and fiercely, successfully
guarded in the windy night that followed the revolutionary sunset. Let
the revolution fail. No matter, if only in America, in England, in
France, in Germany, men know what it was that failed, and how it failed,
who betrayed it, who murdered it. Man does not live by his deeds so much
as by the purposes of his deeds. We have seen the flight of the young
eagles. Nothing can destroy that fact, even if, later in the day, the
eagles drop to earth, one by one, with broken wings.
It is hard here, with the tragedy so close at hand, so intimate, not to
forget the immediate practical purpose of my writing. It is this: to set
down, as shortly as possible the story of the development of the Soviet
power in Russia, to show what forces in Russia worked against that power
and why; to explain what exactly the Soviet government is, and how the
end of the Soviet government will mean the end of the revolution,
whatever may be the apparent character of any form of government that
succeeds it.
A. R.
Moscow, May 14th, 1918.
AN OPEN LETTER TO AMERICA
The March Revolution in Russia
REVOLUTIONS are not definite political acts carried out by the majority
in a nation who are unanimous in desiring a single definite object.
Revolutionaries and their historians often try to give them that
character afterwards, but that is only an illustration of man's general
tendency to supply his instinctive acts with family pedigrees of
irreproachable orderly reasoning. It would be less dignified but more
honest to admit that revolution is a kind of speeding up of the
political flux, during which tendencies that in ordinary times would
perhaps only become noticeable in the course of years, reach a full
fruition in a few weeks or days. Revolution turns the slow river of
political development into a rapid, in which the slightest action has an
immediate effect, and the canoe of government answers more violently to
a paddle dipped for a moment than in more ordinary times to the
organized and prolonged effort of its whole crew.
Those servants of the autocracy who fomented disorder in Petrograd in
March, 1917, believed that by creating and suppressing an artificial
premature revolt they could forestall and perhaps altogether prevent the
more serious revolt against themselves which they had good reason to
expect in the future. They were wrong, precisely for the reason
suggested in the first paragraph. They were wrong because revolution is
not an act of political life, but a state of political life. Hoping to
crush a political act, they created the state in which the old means of
control slipped from their hands and they became incapable of the
suppression of any acts whatsoever.
Their immediate political opponents made the same mistake as the
servants of the autocracy. They believed that the autocracy could carry
out its plan and therefore did their best to prevent the revolution.
Thus, in the days before the revolution of March, 1917, began, we had
the spectacle of the autocracy wrestling with the bourgeoisie, both far
removed from the actual people, both gambling with the lives of the
people, with entirely different objects; The autocracy was trying to
create a revolution which should fail. The bourgeoisie was trying to
prevent the autocracy from creating a revolution at all. Looking back
over a year, it is almost laughable to think that it was the autocracy
that arrested the whole Labor Group of the Central War Industries
Committee because that group of patriotic socialists had shown
themselves capable of preventing trouble with the workmen. It is more
than laughable to remember that Miliukov, the Cadet leader, sent a
statement to the papers alleging that some one pretending to be MUiukov
had been urging the workmen to come out into the streets, but that
actually he begged the workmen, for their own sakes, to do nothing of
the kind.
This is not the place in which to give a detailed account of the methods
whereby the autocracy prepared the artificial fireworks which,
unfortunately for them, turned into a very genuine volcano. It is enough
to say that for several months before the revolution they had been
running kindergarten classes for policemen in the use of machine guns
just outside Petrograd, that armored cars had been, kept back from the
front with a view to moving target practice in the streets of the
capital, and that weeks before the actual disorders Petrograd had been
turned into a fortified battleground, with machine gun embrasures in the
garrets of the houses at strategical vantage points. Meanwhile the food
shortage, already serious in the preceding September, had been steadily
emphasized. The whole labor of the country had been mobilized, put in
uniforms, armed, and taken from the land, thus insuring starvation for
the nation as a whole in the not distant future. Starvation in the
present was assured by the complete breakdown of the always inadequate
transport. Dissatisfaction with the government was common to every class
of the population, although it had different causes. Thus the
bourgeoisie were dissatisfied with the government because it put
difficulties in the way of a successful waging of the war that was to
give Constantinople to Russia. The aristocracy were dissatisfied with
the Tsar on account of his inability to keep his family in order, or to
hide the -fact that it was in disorder. The folk, the great bulk of the
nation, were dissatisfied with the government because they held the
government responsible for their increasingly difficult conditions. They
were dissatisfied with the government for waging the war, while the
classes above them were dissatisfied with the government for not waging
it well enough.
For one moment these various discontents were united and in one matter.
When the revolution had begun, when the flux had already gathered speed,
when the banks of the hitherto placid stream were already crumbling
under pressure of the torrent, there was not a single class in the
nation that was not dissatisfied with the Tsar. The Tsar, accordingly,
left the stage as politely as-he could, as painlessly as a person in a
play. And, seeing the bloodless character of his removal, and mistaking
his removal for the object and end of the revolution, English, Americans
and French united in applauding the most moderate, the biggest, the most
surprising revolution in the world. The bourgeois classes in the
fighting countries and those of the labor classes who by reading
newspapers had been tamed to a happy acquiescence in bourgeois ideas
were a little troubled lest the disturbance in Russia should affect
their war, they having forgotten that they were fighting for democracy
and that the enfranchisement of 180 million souls was in itself a
greater victory than they had set out to gain; so that, from that moment
on, the main object of the war should have been to save that victory.
But,
if the bourgeois classes in the Allied countries were a little troubled,
their disquiet was as nothing in comparison with the helpless terror of
the bourgeois classes of Russia. They had taken no part in the actual
starting of the revolution. Miliukov, as he openly confessed to his
party, had seen from his window the soldiers pouring out into the street
with red flags to fight for the people instead of for their masters, and
he said to himself: " There goes the Russian Revolution, and it will be
crushed in a quarter of an hour." A little later, he had seen more
soldiers in the streets, and decided that it would not be crushed so
easily. It was only when the risks had already been taken by plain
soldiers and workmen, by Cossacks who refused to fire on them; it was
only when the revolution had begun, that the already existing organ of
the bourgeoisie, the Duma, threw itself into line, and, foam on the
crest of an irresistible wave, tried vainly to pretend that it had the
power to control and direct the wave itself.
Already a newer, more vital organ was forming. While Miliukov was
formulating his ideas about the preservation of the dynasty, or, in
other words, the transfer of the autocracy to the bourgeoisie, the
Soviet of Workmen's Deputies, at first merely a small group of Duma
Labor Members, had formulated quite other ideas, had declared that the
revolution belonged to those who made it, not to those who stood aside
and then sought to profit by it, and had stated that neither Miliukov
nor the out worn Duma had the right to decide their future for those who
had won their freedom by risking their lives, but that that task would
be undertaken by a Constituent Assembly which should represent all
Russia. Subsequent history illustrated the necessary opportunism of all
parties in a time of revolution, since within a few weeks Miliukov and
his party had declared for a republic, and, when the Constituent
Assembly met, it had already earned for itself a place like that of the
Duma among the relics of the past, and was gently set aside by the
Soviet, which had been the first cause of its summoning.
The Provisional Government and the Soviet.
There were thus formed two bodies, each of which claimed to represent
the revolutionary nation. The first of these was the Provisional
Government, which was appointed by an executive committee of the Duma,
and so did indirectly represent that body, which, never fully
representative of the people, had lost in the course of the war any
claim to stand for anything except the bourgeois and privileged classes.
The second of these was the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' deputies.
Each thousand workmen had the right to send one member to the Soviet,
and each company of soldiers. From the very first there could be no sort
of doubt in the mind of an unprejudiced observer as to which of these
two bodies best represented the Russian people. I do not think I shall
ever again be so happy in my life as I was during those first days when
I saw working men and peasant soldiers sending representatives of their
class and not of mine. I remembered Shelley's
Shake your chains to earth like dew
Which in sleep had fallen on you-
Ye are many-they are few,
and
wondered that this thing had not come to pass before. And I thought how
applicable to revolution are Sir Thomas Browne's words on the Flood,
when he wrote: "That there was a Deluge once seems not to me so great a
Miracle as that there is not one always."
Immediately there became visible a definite fissure, soon a wide gulf,
between the ideals of these two bodies, the government and the
representatives of the people. The people, the working classes, the
peasants, who suffered most from the war, demanded that steps should be
taken to secure peace. They did not want to fight to get territory for
the sake of some phantasmagoric gain which did not affect them, which
they did not understand. They were starving already, and saw worse
starvation ahead. The government, on the other hand, was, if anything,
except for the presence in it of Kerenski, the labor member, more
definitely imperialistic than the autocracy whose place it had taken.
The gulf between the working classes and the government became suddenly
deeper when it was realized that the future of the revolution depended
on the possession of the army. If the army were not to be swept into the
revolution, if it were allowed to remain apart from politics, it would
be a passive weapon in the hands of the government, which would thus be
able to suppress the Soviets, and so the true expression of the people's
will, whenever it should think fit. If the government had been able to
retain possession of the army, then Miliukov might have had his way and
the bourgeoisie would have secured the profits of the revolt of the
masses.
This, however, was not to be, and immediately the contradiction between
a revolution and war of the imperialistic kind became evident. The army,
which at that time meant practically the whole of the younger peasantry,
took the share in politics it had a right to take. From that moment the
future of the Soviets was assured, and the bourgeois government was
doomed to be a government only by the good will of the Soviets, who,
within a few days of the beginning of the revolution, were the only real
power in the country.
That they had been right in fearing retention of the army by the
bourgeoisie was proved again and again, by Kerenski, Kornilov, Kaledin,
Alexeiev, Dutov, at subsequent periods of the revolution, each one in
turn basing his resistance to the Soviets on some part of the army which
had been kept free from the contagion of free political expression.
Then began the long struggle of the summer. The Soviets, in which the
moderates who, mistrusting their own abilities, desired to keep the
government as a sort of executive organ, were in a majority, exerted all
their influence on the government in the direction of peace. The
government made its representations to the Allies, but, at any rate at
first, gambled in the future, and pretended that things were not so bad,
and that Russia could still take an active part in the war. There was a
decisive moment when Miliukov wrote a note to the Allies calculated to
lull them to believe that the changes in. Russia meant nothing and that
Russia stood by her old claims. The soldiers and people poured into the
streets in protest, and that lie had to be publicly withdrawn.
Already there was serious opposition to the Moderate party in the
Soviets from the Bolsheviks, who urged that coalition with the
bourgeoisie was merely postponing peace and bringing starvation and
disaster nearer. The Moderates proposed a Stockholm conference, at which
the socialist groups of all countries should meet and try to come to a
common understanding. This was opposed by the Allied governments and by
the Bolsheviks, on the ground that the German Majority Socialists would
be the agents of the German government. One deadlock followed another.
Each successive deadlock strengthened the party of the Bolsheviks, who
held that the Provisional Government was an incubus and that all
authority should belong to the Soviets.
The Bolshevik leaders, Lenin and Trotski, had come from exile in western
countries not merely to take their share in a Russian revolution, but to
use Russia in kindling the world revolution. They called for peace, but
peace, for them, was not an end in itself. They could say, with Christ,
that they brought not peace but a sword. For they hoped that in stirring
the working classes of the world to demand peace from their governments,
they would be putting into their hands the sword that was necessary for
the Social Revolution, in which cause they had both, like many of their
friends, spent the best years of their lives.
In their own country, at any rate, they have proved that they were right
in their calculation. The struggle for peace, the failure to obtain it,
shook the government into the disastrous adventure of the Galician
advance, shook it again with the Galician retreat, weakened it with
every telegram from Allied countries that emphasized the continuance of
the war. Each shock to the government was also a shock for the Moderate
party in the Soviets. The struggle in Russia became, as the Bolsheviks
wished it should become, a struggle between the classes, a struggle in
which the issue became ever clearer between the working and the
privileged classes. The government went to Moscow for moral support, and
came back without it. The Kornilov mutiny, a definite attempt against
the Soviets by a handful of the privileged classes, merely strengthened
the organizations it was intended to overthrow. Within the Soviets the
Moderate party, which had already come by force of events to be a sort
of annex of the bourgeoisie, grew weaker and weaker. Just as the
government went to Moscow to seek support in a conference, so the
Moderate party, feeling support slipping from under it, knowing that the
next meeting of the All-Russian Assembly of Soviets would find it in a
minority, treacherously sought new foothold in an artificial democratic
assembly. Not even the tactics of the Moderate party shook the actual
fabric of the Soviets, and when, in October, first Petrograd, then
Moscow, showed a huge Bolshevik majority, the Bolshevik leaders were so
confident that they had the country behind them that they made every
single arrangement for the ejection of the government openly over the
telephone, and, notwithstanding, neither the government nor the old
Moderates (now in a minority) could muster authority to prevent them.
The point that I wish to make is this: that, from the first moment of
the revolution to the present day the real authority of the Soviets has
been unshaken. The October revolution did not give authority to the
Soviets. That had always been theirs, by their very nature. It was
merely a public open illustration of the change of opinion brought about
in the Soviets themselves by the change of opinion in the working men
and soldiers who elected them. The October revolution cleared away the
waste growths that hid the true government of Russia from the world, and,
as the smoke of the short struggle died away, it was seen that that
government had merely to formulate an authority it already possessed.
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